NOTATION AND LIST OF ACRONYMS
For the Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDBAs), the conservative approach is being challenged by a more realistic, Best-Estimate (BE) analysis, which sets forth the calculation of safety margins with realistic models and BE assumptions to account for the consequences related to the failures in some protective barriers.
On one side, the reduction in the conservatism of the analyses leads to more efficient plant design and operation. On the other side, the relaxation of the conservatisms entails that sensitivity and uncertainty analyses be carried out to properly quantify the safety margins while capturing the associated uncertainty for confidence evaluation. This requires a revision in probabilistic terms of the concept of safety margins [Gavrilas et al., 2004] and repeated model runs for the associated sensitivity and uncertainty analyses. This is even more so when i) analyzing requests for changes to the licensing bases, within a risk-informed decision-making philosophy and ii) checking design solutions of new NPPs whose safety analysis relies on newly developed models and codes, because the combination of the uncertainties in the analysis could reduce significantly and in an unexpected way the safety margins [USNRC, 1998; Martorell et al., 2006] . This situation may increase the risk of accidents, leading to the dissatisfaction of some of the Basic Safety Functions (BSFs) (i.e., reactivity control, residual heat removal, primary pressure control and containment release) that have to be carried out by the implemented safety systems to avoid major dangerous consequences.
In general, uncertainty affecting the plant behavior can be considered of two types: that due to inherent variability in the system behavior and that due to lack of knowledge and information on the system. The former type of uncertainty is often referred to as objective, aleatory, stochastic whereas the latter is called subjective, epistemic, state-ofknowledge [Apostolakis, 1990; Helton, 2004] .
The distinction between aleatory and epistemic uncertainty plays a particularly important role in the risk assessment framework applied to complex engineered systems. In the context of risk analysis, the aleatory uncertainty is related to the occurrence of the events which define the various possible accident scenarios whereas epistemic uncertainty arises from a lack of knowledge of fixed but poorly known parameter values entering the evaluation of the probabilities and consequences of the accident scenarios.
The present work addresses the epistemic uncertainty affecting the evaluation of the safety margins. Under the probabilistic viewpoint here undertaken to represent uncertainties, the code for safety margin evaluation needs to be repeatedly run with different values of the thermal-hydraulic parameters, sampled from predefined probability distributions; the outcomes of these runs are then statistically analyzed to estimate with a specified confidence a given percentile of the distribution of the safety parameter used to calculate the safety margin [Guba et al., 2003; Nutt et al., 2004] . The confidence intervals of the estimated safety margins is also computed: this additional information provides a realistic refinement of the estimates that is beneficial to power plant owners; on the other hand, from the viewpoint of the regulatory body it increases the robustness of the safety case by allowing verification of the fact that uncertainty in the safety margin estimates does not lead to exceedance of the regulatory safety thresholds.
In general terms, because of the large computing times required to run the codes, the procedure can be computationally quite expensive. Thus, tin this work the statistical analyses of the model evaluations for obtaining confidence intervals for safety parameters estimates rely on the use of Order Statistics (OS), along a non-parametric approach initially explored by [Wilks, 1941; Wilks, 1942] ; this brings the advantage that the number of code calculations needed for safety margins evaluation is independent of the number of uncertain input parameters and provides a given confidence on the reliability of the calculated point-estimate obtained with a limited number of code runs. Figure 1 shows a schematic sketch of the non-parametric procedure here adopted [Secchi et al., 2008] ; for ease of illustration, a single safety parameter y is considered. By this procedure for safety margin calculation, the analyst can produce results with the level of confidence against uncertainty required for presenting a robust safety case to the Regulatory Authority.
The approach is applied to a case study regarding a set of accident scenarios related to the Residual Heat Removal system (RHRs) of the High Temperature Reactor-Pebble Modular (HTR-PM) [Zhengy et al., 2008] . The application is of safety significance because the RHRs is a passive safety system which operates without external input energy [IAEA, 1991] and is thus expected to contribute significantly to the improvement of plant safety [Mathews et al., 2008] .
However, the uncertainties involved in the modeling of the behavior of passive systems are usually larger than in active systems, due to lack of data on some underlying phenomena and scarce or null operating experience over the wide range of conditions encountered during operation [Pagani et al., 2005] .
This situation may actually increase the risk of accidents leading to the dissatisfaction of some of the BSFs (i.e., reactivity control, residual heat removal, primary pressure control and containment release) that the safety systems are designed for. In fact, deviations in the natural forces and in the conditions of the underlying physical principles from the model expected ones can impair the function of the system itself [Marquès et al., 2005; Burgazzi, 2007] .
The paper organization is as follows. In Section 2, the basic principles underpinning the BE nuclear safety analysis in the presence of uncertainties are provided together with an illustration of the method for uncertainty estimation here employed. In Section 3, the main characteristics of the High Temperature Reactor-Pebble Modular (HTR-PM) are briefly introduced, the Residual Heat Removal system (RHRs) accident scenarios are described and the simulations performed to analyze the system response to the accident scenario are presented. In Section 4, the results of the application of the proposed framework for the estimation of the safety margin of the maximum outlet water temperature reached during the accidents described in Section 3 are provided. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in Section 5. Step 2: Code batch-calculations
Batch number g:
Step 3: OS batch-percentile estimation
Step 4: OS percentile estimation
Step 5 ( )
For fixed values of x , the output values y is deterministically computed.
Formulation of safety margins in presence of uncertainty
The defense-in-depth principle of nuclear safety is founded on the implementation of protective barriers between the radioactive products and the environment. Each barrier is a physical device whose integrity is measured with reference to given characteristic safety parameters. When a barrier is subjected to abnormal conditions, some of the related safety parameters may exceed their safety envelope, which results in the failure of the barrier.
With reference to a generic accident scenario k and a characteristic safety variable ( ) k y j to be limited from above by an upper threshold limit j U , the safety margin M(y j ,k) can be defined as:
The dual definition of the safety margin for a safety parameter y j to be limited from below by a threshold value j L is straightforward.
Estimation of safety margins
The safety margins are calculated by running the thermal-hydraulic codes used for safety analysis. In presence of uncertainty, a large number of runs of the code may be required to adequately represent the full distribution of the safety parameter values in output. The problem is that the computer runs of the complex models of plant dynamics used for safety analysis are computationally very expensive. To overcome this hurdle one may resort either to simplified analytical/numerical models, such as those based on lumped effective parameters [Marseguerra et al., 2004] , or to empirical models, e.g. artificial neural networks and fuzzy logic systems [Marseguerra et al., 2003] , suitably set up so as to best fit to the data available from the plant.
Another possibility to reduce the computational burden, which may be used in combination with the former ones, is to only compute some percentiles of the output distribution, estimated with a limited number of runs. In this case, the confidence in the estimates becomes crucial for decision making and must, thus, be quantified [Wilks, 1941; Wilks, 1942; Guba et al., 2003; Nutt et al., 2004] .
This latter approach is undertaken in this work and the problem of confidence building and quantification is addressed. A sample of a small number N of input parameter values is drawn by the Monte Carlo method from their probability distributions. The sample of N input vectors thereby obtained is input to the code which is correspondingly run N times, thus producing a random sample of N output vectors. These can be used to estimate a given percentile of the safety margin probability distribution. To obtain the desired confidence in the safety margin percentile, the number N of code runs is defined on the basis of the Order Statistics (OS) methodology, in its nonparametric formulation which applies independently from the type of probability distribution of the output data under study (in this case unknown) [Wilks, 1941; Wilks, 1942] . As we shall see, this amounts to ordering the elements of the random sample by increasing value, the element in the r th place being the statistic of order r, and using the order statistics for estimating the percentiles of the distribution (Section 2.4) with the desired confidence. Following this methodology, the number of runs required can be kept low because only statistical intervals are estimated and not the full probability distributions of the output.
Estimation of percentiles using Order Statistics
For ease of illustration, let us refer the discussion to a one dimensional output y, e.g. the Pellet Cladding Temperature (PCT) or the cooling water outlet temperature.
The N runs of the code, each one with a different input vector i x , produce N output defining the safety limit for the integrity of the protective barriers. This would provide a more realistic assessment than the verification that a single run conservative estimate of y is within the safety envelope (e.g., PCT is less than 1200°C or the cooling water outlet temperature is less than 95°C).
Given the computational costs associated with the estimation of the full distribution, one is forced to focus on verifying that with some level of confidence β, a certain percentage i.e. the number of BE code runs, can be kept low because only intervals related to the γ th percentile are estimated and not the full probability distribution generating the data.
For the application of interest in the present work, the confidence intervals for the γ th percentile are computed using the γ th percentile estimates obtained from G batches of newly simulated accident transients. To verify that the estimated confidence interval does not exceed the safety thresholds, two-sided confidence intervals are computed.
The computational approach for percentile point-and confidence intervalsestimation
The computational approach of Figure 1 for the evaluation of a point estimate of the γ-percentile and of a confidence interval associated to it, to be used for the safety margin evaluation, is taken from [Secchi et al., 2008] . In what follows, the steps of the procedure are repeated for reader's convenience (reference distributions and notations are shown in and is used as point estimate of the γ-percentile of the output distribution for safety margin evaluations.
-
Step 5: Confidence interval calculation. In alternative to the point estimate of
Step 4, we generate a confidence interval estimate of the median of the distribution of the estimator ŷ γ , as follows: ii) set r and s to positive integers satisfying the inequality 0 < r < (N+1)/2 < s ≤ N;
iii) then, the random interval 
THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM BLOCKAGE SCENARIO IN THE HTR-PM

The HTR-PM
Starting from the gas-cooled reactors in the 1950s and advanced gas-cooled reactors in the 1960s, the high-temperature gas-cooled reactors have developed for nearly 50 years.
Today's Chinese design of the High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor-Pebble bed
Modular (HTR-PM) is based on the technology and experiences of the HTR-10 10MW
high-temperature gas-cooled test reactor (HTR-10) designed in China in 2000.
At a first glance, the HTR-PM design has the following key technical features [Zhengy et al., 2008]:
• Characteristic coated fuel particles are used, which consist of uranium dioxide (UO 2 ) fuel kernel coated by tri-isotropic (TRISO) ceramics such as pyrolytic y = safety parameter carbon and silicon carbide (SiC), in order to retain fission products in the particle under a fuel cladding temperature of 1600ºC in accident cases.
• A one-zone core design is implemented, consisting of approximately 420,000 spherical fuel elements in a pebble-bed with a diameter of 3m and an average height of 11m.
• Ceramic materials of graphite and carbon bricks, which are high-temperature resistant, surround the active reactor core.
• Decay heat in the fuel elements is dissipated by means of heat conduction and radiation to the outside of the reactor pressure vessel, and then taken away to the ultimate heat sink by water cooling panels on the surface of the primary concrete cell. Therefore, no coolant flow through the reactor core is necessary for decay heat removal in case of loss of coolant flow or loss of pressure accidents.
Maximum accident fuel temperature shall be limited to 1600ºC.
• Spherical fuel elements are charged and discharged in a so-called "multi-pass" mode, which means that before the fuel elements reach the discharge burn-up, they go through the reactor core several times.
• Several of HTR-PM modular reactors can be built at one site to satisfy the power capacity demand of the utility. Some auxiliary systems and facilities can be shared among the modules.
The Passive RHRs
The enhanced safety of the HTR-PM is mainly due to the implementation of passive safety systems [Zhao et al., 2008] . Figure 3 sketches the equipment layout of one of the 3 loops of the RHR system implemented in the HTR-PM. The water cooled wall gets the heat from the reactor vessel by thermal radiation; then, the pipe transfers the water to the air-cooled heat exchanger located in the air-cooled tower; the cool air takes the heat away from the heat exchanger to the environment. 
The RHRs blockage scenarios
The outlet water temperature , T which may exceed c T [Zhao et al., 2008] . For this reason, these scenarios are considered safety relevant and a careful analysis of it must be performed.
Simulations of the accident scenarios
A simplified zero-dimensional description of the thermo-hydraulic behavior of the RHRs has been implemented in MATLAB and used to simulate accident blockage transients.
The model allows the computation of the maximum outlet water temperature reached during an accident scenario.
The simulation code models the following phases of the process:
1. The residual heat radiates from the reactor vessel and other thermal sources to the water in the water-cooled wall;
2. Because of the difference in temperature, natural convection will initiate through water, in the water-cooled wall and pipes connected with the air-cooled heat exchanger; then, heat will transfer to the water side of the heat exchanger;
3. The heat will transfer by thermal conduction from the water side to the air side of the heat exchanger, due to the difference of temperature;
4. As the air-cooled heat exchanger is located in the air-cooled tower, natural convection of air will set up and take heat to the final heat trap-atmosphere.
The model fed with the nominal "best estimate" values of the input parameters is assumed to be "sufficiently best estimate". The RHRs accident complete blockage transients are generated by sampling the involved 37 input parameters from probability distributions defined on the basis of previous experience and/or information obtained by skilled experts (Table 1) . Table 1 Parameters which are regarded relevant for the behavior of the passive RHRs.
RESULTS
The non-parametric procedure for percentile estimation introduced in Section 2.5 is hereafter illustrated with reference to the estimation of the safety margin of the maximum outlet water temperature , w out T reached during the accident scenarios A, B and C of complete/partial blockage of the passive RHRs of the HTR-PM described in Section 3.
Order Statistics has been applied to a sample of maximum outlet water temperature values obtained by simulation, for estimating the γ th percentile with γ=0.95. Then, G estimates of the γ th percentile have been collected by the OS applied to G different batch samples. Finally, confidence intervals for the real γ th percentile have been evaluated.
The procedural steps described in Section 2.5 have been performed as follows:
Step 1: BE code calculations.
To demonstrate the feasibility of the procedure, we take m=1 and β=γ=0.95; this leads to the smallest sample size N=59 for the OS ( ) β γ -percentile estimates.
Step 2: Code batch-calculations.
A number of G=50 batches of N output values have been computed.
Step 3: OS batch-percentile estimation.
For each of the G=50 batches, the ( ) Step 4: OS percentile estimation.
The median of the sample Ŷ and its safety margin are evaluated for the accident scenarios A, B and C. The results are provided in the second column of Tables 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
Step 5: Confidence interval calculation.
Because of the limitation on the sample size used in the estimation, the safety acceptance criteria cannot be based solely on the best estimate results. Hence, the uncertainty of the estimated safety margin must be properly informed, e.g. by computing its confidence interval. With reference to the accident scenarios A, B and C, the confidence interval of level α=0.95, with r=1 and s=49, are provided in the second column of Tables 2, 3 It can be seen that:
-scenario A has a negative safety margin: the occurrence of this accident scenario has to be avoided;
-from scenario C to scenario B the safety margin shrinks; -scenarios B and C can be classified as safe, because with positive safety margins.
This means that, in absence of any other component failure in the system, although one of the loops is failed the system can continue to produce energy; on the other hand, in case of occurrence of scenario B, a maintenance action has to be adopted quickly to reactivate the failed RHR loop; -as shown in Figure 4 , in general terms, the probability distributions of the safety 
Improvements of the estimation accuracy by means of higher values of m, N and G
It is known that using higher values of m, N and G would allow increasing the reliability on the estimated confidence interval . Indeed, conservatism is reduced by taking higher values of m, N and G [Nutt et al., 2004] and, by comparison of the results, the analyst would feel reassured that the estimates obtained have a low probability of differing significantly from the true values (usually unknown), and that the estimated maximum outlet water temperature value satisfies the safety threshold limit U.
In this view, the same procedure detailed in Section 2.5 has been repeated increasing the number of samples G. For the accident scenarios A, B and C, the results are provided with m=1, N=59, G=100, α=0.95, r=3 and s=97 and reported in the third column of Tables 2, 3 -for all 3 accident scenarios, the application of the procedure with G=100 reduces the conservatism in the results since it provides the lowest point-estimate values of the maximum outlet water temperature (larger positive safety margins for scenarios B and C and smaller negative safety margin for Scenario A).
For comparison, the procedure detailed in Section 2.5 has been repeated increasing the number of simulations N: the value m=50 leads to a sample size N=1228. The results are provided in Tables 5,6 and 7. It can be seen that:
-increasing m and correspondingly increasing the number of values that are requested at least to lie beyond the "extent" γ of the cumulative probability, the estimation 0.95ŷ of the percentile tends to narrow the true 0.95 y , which have been evaluated running the code 100000 times for each accident scenario. By testing the 100000 outputs for Normality by means of the Lilliefors Test [Lilliefors, 1967] and then applying a parametric approach for the 95-th percentile estimations, the estimate of 0.95 y has turned out to be equal to -3.22, 40.66 and 58.70 for scenarios A, B and C, respectively.
-for all the 3 accident scenarios the application of the procedure with m=50 increases the confidence on the estimated percentile value with respect to that with m=1, as demonstrated by the shrinking of the confidence intervals.
As an example, Figure 5 shows the combined effect of larger values of m and G with reference to the results provided for the accident scenario C. Finally, the physical conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis is that, for the safe operation of the plant, two RHR loops are enough; the 3 rd loop can be considered as a redundancy in the RHRs to guarantee high availability of the safety function. The large safety margins computed in case of the safe scenarios (B and C) suggest a possible improvement of the whole system design to avoid excessive conservatism leading to a more efficient plant design and operation.
CONCLUSIONS
A computational framework of literature has been applied for the estimation of the safety margin on the maximum outlet water temperature of the passive RHRs reached during some accident scenarios of the HTR-PM.
The procedure exploits non-parametric Order Statistics performed on a limited number of BE code calculations for providing confidence intervals on the estimated percentiles. An analysis has been performed on the effects of some key parameters, related to the size of the statistical sample and on the number of uncertain input variables considered in the analysis.
The procedure has been demonstrated to give reliable (the estimates are similar despite of the increase of the number of simulation), robust (confidence intervals are very narrow) and conservative (increasing the number of simulations, the estimates tend to narrow down to the true value) estimates of the 95 th percentiles of the safety parameters distributions.
The method has been demonstrated effective in that it is capable of indicating the passive system safety conditions, accounting for the uncertainties in the model parameters and in the estimate itself. 2008ZX06902-009).
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